Here are some of my papers. You can find the complete list of my publications on my CV. If you are interested in one of my papers and I have not included it below, please email me. I'll do my best to get you a copy. And thank you for your interest in my work.

2019. “Basically Deserved Blame and its Value.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.

2019. “The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert.Journal of Ethics.

2019. “Watsonian Compatibilism.” In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Justin Coates and Neal Tognazzini, eds. Vol. 5: 5-37.

2018. “A Critical Assessment of Pereboom’s Frankfurt-Style Example.Philosophical Studies. 175: 3117-29. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-017-0997-z. 

2018. “Power, Social Inequities, and the Conversational Theory of Moral Responsibility.” In K. Hutchison, C. Mackenzie, and M. Oshana, eds., Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press:38-58.

2018. “Resisting Todd’s Moral-Standing Zygote Argument.Philosophical Quarterly 68: 657-78.

2017 with Brandon Warmke. “Does Situationism Threaten Free Will and Moral Responsibility?” Journal of Moral Philosophy: 1-36.

2016. “A Modest Historical Theory of Moral Responsibility.” Journal of Ethics. 20: 83-105.

2015 with Chad Van Schoelandt. “Crossing a Mesh Theory with a Reasons-Responsive Theory.” In A. Buckareff, C. Moya, and S. Rosell, Agency, Freedom, and Responsibility. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 44-64.

2015 with Benjamin Kozuch, “Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mental Illness.” In D. Moseley and G. Gala, eds., Philosophy and Psychiatry. New York: Routledge Press: 89-113.

2014. “Compatibilist Ultimacy: Resisting the Threat of Kane’s U Condition.” In D. Palmer, ed. Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates. NY: Oxford University Press: 71-87. 

2014. “Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hard-liner Takes it on the Chin.”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: 89: 467-84.

2013. “Directed Blame and Conversation.” In Blame: Its Nature and Norms, eds. Justin Coates and Neal Tognazinni. New York: Oxford University Press: 119-40. 

2013 with Brandon Warmke. “Moral Responsibility, Forgiveness, and Conversation.” Free Will and Moral Responsibility, In Ishtiyaque Haji and Justin Caouette, eds. (Cambridge Scholars Series): 189-212.

2013. “Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms” In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, David Shoemaker, ed., Vol. 1 (NY: OUP): 151-84.

2012. “Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism.” Journal of Ethics. 16: 145-74.

2011. “Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories and Reasons-Responsive Theories.” In R. Kane, ed., 2011, Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press): 175-98.

2010. “Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments? Getting the Dialectic Right.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88.3: 429-43.

2009. “Compatibilism and Desert.” Philosophical Studies 144.1: 3-13. 

2009. “Moral Monster or Responsible Person? Memento’s Leonard as a Case Study in Defective Agency” in Andrew Kania, ed., Philosophers on Memento. Routledge.

2008. “A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-case ArgumentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77.1: 142-59.

2008. “Frankfurt’s Argument against Alternative Possibilities: Looking Beyond the Examples,” Nous 42: 770-93.   

2008. “Putting the Lie on the Control Condition for Moral Responsibility.”  Philosophical Studies 139.1: 29-37.

2008. “Saying Goodbye to the Direct Argument the Right Way.” Philosophical Review 117.3: 349-383.     

2008. “Ultimacy and Sweet Jane,” In D. Cohen and N. Trakakis, eds., Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. (Cambridge Scholars Press).

2006. “Collective Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30: 16-34.

2005. “Reasons Reactivity & Incompatibilist Intuitions.” Philosophical Explorations vol. 8, No.2: 131-43.

2005. “Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29: 163-80.

2004. with Ishtiyaque Haji. “Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate about Freedom and Alternative Possibilities.” Journal of Philosophy 101: 299-314. 

2004. “The Relationship Between Autonomous and Morally Responsible Agency.” In J. S. Taylor, ed., Personal Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 205-34.

2004. “Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents.” Philosophical Topics 32: 169-92.

2003. “Robustness, Control, and the Demand for Morally Significant Alternatives.” In Widerker and McKenna, eds., Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility (Ashgate) 2003: 201-17.

2001. “Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, and the Transfer of Non-responsibility.”  American Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 38, No. 1: 37-52.

1998. “Does Strong Compatibilism Survive Frankfurt-Style Counter-Examples?” Philosophical Studies Vol. 91, No.3: 259-64.

1998. “The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A Defense of Strawsonian Compatibilism.” Journal of Ethics Vol. 2, No. 2: 123-42.

1997. “Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counter-Example Strategy.” Journal  of Social Philosophy Vol. 28, No. 3, Winter: 71-85.